Similar Search Results

Bidder preferences among auction institutions

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Tim - 2002

This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627275

Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Sonsino, Doron - 2001

We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615428

Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions : an experimental study

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, … - 2001

independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the … the strong and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second–price auctions. -- Experiments ; Sealed Bid Auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612559

Privately contributing to public goods over time : an experimental study

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765

Compensating the cooperators : is sorting in the prisoner’s dilemma possible?

Bohnet, Iris; Kübler, Dorothea - 2000

Choice between different versions of a game may provide a means of sorting, allowing players with different preferences to self-select into groups of similar types. We experimentally investigate whether auctioning off the right to play a prisoner’s dilemma game in which the cost of unilateral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612572

Third- and higher-price auctions

Wolfstetter, Elmar - 1995

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders’ valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders’...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009630548

Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence

Hopkins, Ed - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2005

of the standard model which do not respond to changes in supply or demand. Despite incomplete information, equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750729

Transactions that did not happen and their influence on prices

Kirman, Alan P.; Härdle, Wolfgang; Schulz, Rainer; … - 2002

. Each offer, counteroffer and refusal conveys information to the two parties concerned about the state of the market since … distribution of the buyer's reservation price. We show that periods with no buyer refusals, of offers or bargaining with no …'s favour during the day. These presumptions are then shown to be confirmed by our data set. -- Bargaining ; Markets …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009624846