Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 1,319
Cover Image
Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Loss Aversion : A Field Experiment
Fryer, Roland G, Jr - 2012
Domestic attempts to use financial incentives for teachers to increase student achievement have been ineffective. In this paper, we demonstrate that exploiting the power of loss aversion--teachers are paid in advance and asked to give back the money if their students do not improve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460423
Cover Image
Prospect Theory and Asset Prices
Barberis, Nicholas - 1999
, and predictability of stock returns. The key to our results is that the agent's risk-aversion changes over time as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471569
Cover Image
Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2000
managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137
Cover Image
Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
Cover Image
Who’s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives
Gilje, Erik P. - 2019
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479596
Cover Image
Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Edmans, Alex - 2009
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
Cover Image
Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
Cover Image
Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information
Novaes, Walter - 2003
Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labeled bureaucratic' and inefficient. This paper argues that the thin line between efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468935
Cover Image
Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment
Gorton, Gary - 1996
through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473055
Cover Image
Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives
Lee, Jongsub - 2017
: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the … can use compensation awards that increase managerial performance incentives (delta) and risk-taking incentives (vega) in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453649