This paper investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the...

Acquired wisdom has it that the allocation of pollution rights to firms hinders their willingness to undertake uncertain R&D projects for environmental-friendly technologies. We revisit this issue in a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in a lottery to attain pollution...

A differential oligopoly game with advertising is investigated, where different dynamics occur between two groups of agents, the former playing a competitive Nash game and the latter cooperating as a cartel. Sufficient conditions for stability and a qualitative analysis of the profit ratio and...

The seminal paper by Abreu (1986) is revisited to reassess the optimality of one-shot stick-and-carrot punishments. It is shown that there are admissible conditions under which the use of grim trigger strategies with an infinite Nash reversion is more efficient than implementing Abreu’s penal...

A methodological discussion is proposed, aiming at illustrating an analogy between game theory in particular (and mathematical economics in general) and quantum mechanics. This analogy relies on the equivalence of the two fundamental operators employed in the two fields, namely, the expected...

The model proposed in this paper investigates a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may exploit either its own private pool or a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration...

We revisit Benchekroun (2008) to describe a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under static, linear feedback and nonlinear feedback strategies, to show that (i) feedback rules entail resource exhaustion for a finite number of firms; and (ii) feedback strategies are more...

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments....

We investigate the R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in cost-reducing and quality enhancing R&D. Incentives along the two directions are inversely related to the size of market demand, and independent of each other. The stability analysis shows the existence of a unique stable steady state...