remainder in cash. The account features state-dependent rebalancing and time-dependent vesting. It is constantly rebalanced so that the equity fraction remains above a certain threshold; this threshold sensitivity is typically increasing over time even in the absence of career concerns. The...

This paper studies a macroeconomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents in order to invest in financial assets. We pursue three set of results: (i) Going beyond a steady state analysis, we show that adverse shocks cause amplifying price declines not only through...

This paper studies the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with financial frictions. Due to highly non-linear amplication effects, the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes. Risk is endogenous and asset price correlations are high in downturns. In an...

This paper provides a theory of money, whose value depends on the functioning of the intermediary sector, and a unified framework for analyzing the interaction between price and financial stability. Households that happen to be productive in this period finance their capital purchases with...

This paper provides a theory of money, whose value depends on the functioning of the intermediary sector, and a unified framework for analyzing the interaction between price and financial stability. Households that happen to be productive in this period finance their capital purchases with...

We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (1) the prices depend only on the sum of the firms' supplies (2) firms are able to respond to new information quickly and (3) the likelihood ratio for detection of each deviation is a continuous process (so that new information...

We study a continuous-time reputation game between a large player and a population of small players in which the actions of the large player are imperfectly observable. We explore two versions of the game. In the complete information game, in which it is common knowledge that the large player is...

We show that the ways incentives can be provided during dynamic interaction depend very crucially on the manner in which players learn information. This conclusion is established in a general stationary environment with noisy public monitoring and frequent actions. The monitoring process can be...