two sources: the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining. Equilibrium behavior … relative bargaining costs. This contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs, and the pure …

The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of sequential bargaining games in … perfect bargaining mechanisms, which satisfy the desirable properties of incentive compatibility (i.e., each player reports … sequential bargaining game rather than a static mechanism; however, when the buyer's delay costs are higher, then a static …

.S. collective bargaining is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production …

Bargaining often occurs between parties with some shared interest. Partnerships, joint ventures, and cross ownership … are examples. We extend standard bargaining models to allow for joint ownership. Joint ownership reduces costly bargaining … disputes, as bargainers’ interests are more aligned. We then test the theory with collective bargaining data, where employee …

The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement …-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment … preferences, results in bargaining inefficiencies: trade often occurs after costly delay. Thus, the model provides an explanation …

agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an … overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on bargaining with incomplete information. The chapter begins with an … analysis of bargaining within a mechanism design framework. A modern development is provided of the classic result that, given …

We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary … inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute …

We present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union decides between two threats: the union …

to deception about one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems … undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in …