We model retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device in vertical supply relations with private manufacturer information on production costs and consumer demand. With static trade, RPRs are irrelevant, and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient. With repeated trade, RPRs can...

We use broad-based yet detailed data from the economy's goods-producing sectors to investigate firms' ownership of production chains. It does not appear that vertical ownership is primarily used to facilitate transfers of goods along the production chain, as is often presumed: roughly one-half...

This paper analyzes the effects of international openness on vertical integration. Vertical integration can confer a negative externality, by thinning the market for inputs and thus worsening opportunism problems; this induces strategic complementarity and multiple equilibria in the integration...

This paper presents a theory of establishment size dynamics based on the accumulation of industry-specific human capital that simultaneously rationalizes the economy- wide facts on establishment growth rates, exit rates, and size distributions. The theory predicts that establishment growth and...

Recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting. These studies typically considered 'selfish' investments that benefit the investor (e.g., the seller's investment reduces her...

We explore patterns of vertical integration in the US airline industry. Major airlines subcontract portions of their network to regional partners, which may or may not be owned. We investigate if ownership economizes on ex post renegotiation costs. We estimate whether airlines are more likely to...

Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates, and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of...

We analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (conditional on the seller's share of customers' total purchases). With incomplete information about demand, firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers'...