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market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and … reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs, with no significant effects found for other managers or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084265
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769
workers’ pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through ownership of cash flow rights … of robustness tests. Moreover, we find that entrenched CEOs pay more to (i) workers associated with aggressive unions …-executives; and (iii) workers geographically closer to the corporate headquarters. This evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067445
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084697
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power’ approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
We develop a methodology to collect and analyze data on CEOs' time use. The idea - sketched out in a simple theoretical … the presence of governance issues. We follow 94 CEOs of top-600 Italian firms over a pre-specified week and record the … of the firm) and outsiders (people not employed by the firm). Individual CEOs differ systematically in how much time they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854509
A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509