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We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908650
information’ assumption. The ad value is characterized by a tractable analytical solution given observed auction parameters. Using … Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014259686
different distributions. Furthermore, we also analyze second-price all-pay auction. Finally, we show that individual minimum … bids could improve the relative revenue performance of first-price all-pay compared to first-price winner-pay auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264437
fluctuations in prices. In this paper, we examine the dynamic auction design and propose a method to curb price volatility through …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013214329
reserve price that would set a minimum price in allowance auctions. Opponents of an auction reserve price in the EU ETS have … expressed concern that a minimum auction price would interfere with economic operations in the market or would be tantamount to … and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847075
This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates … dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with … a reservation bid for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317322
We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861466
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231973
Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244245
. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693