This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and...

Dieser Beitrag informiert über die Bedeutung von Auktionen im Wirtschaftsleben, über Vor- und Nachteile gängiger Auktionsregeln sowie über grundlegende Konzepte und Ergebnisse der Theorie nichtkooperativer Auktionsspiele. Besonderes Gewicht hat die anschauliche Darstellung und kritische...

This paper gives an account of events, and explains some systematic reasons of the UMTS auction flop in Switzerland. Apart from general market developments, which could not have been anticipated, we argue that auction design which was introduced in England and adopted in Switzerland and...

Dieser Diskussionsbeitrag kommentiert Güths axiomatische Begründung der Zweit-Preis-Auktion. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch Güths umfangreiche Analyse der Lambda-Auktion durch eine einfache und anschaulich interpretierbare Lösung ersetzt. -- auctions ; procurement

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders’ valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders’...

We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R1">Ausubel's (2004)</xref> and yields the same outcome as <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R12">Perry and Reny's...</xref>

This paper analyzes a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous stra tegic variable. It finds equilibria involving a delay to agreement th at is attributable to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers t o signal their relative strength....

This paper concerns the pattern of contributions to a joint project when commitments and enforceable contracts are not available. The authors analyze a game in which partners alternate in making contributions to the project until the project is completed. Contributions are sunk when they are...

We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel's (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny's...

We study a novel dynamic principal--agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model, an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task, the agent learns its level...