This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with that obtained in the...

This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with that obtained in the...

By considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned...

This work analyzes the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technologies when cross-participation exists at ownership level. We show that cross-participation reduces the incentives to adopt the cost-saving production technology.

It is proved that the irrelevance result of Poyago-Theotoky can be extended from the linear-quadratic case to general inverse demand and cost functions. Hence, as long as firms are profitable at the first-best, the optimal subsidy decentralizes it in mixed oligopoly irrespecitve of whether the...

It is proved that the irrelevance result of Poyago-Theotoky can be extended from the linear-quadratic case to general inverse demand and cost functions. Hence, as long as firms are profitable at the first-best, the optimal subsidy decentralizes it in mixed oligopoly irrespecitve of whether the...

White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) prove that in the mixed oligopoly the optimal subsidy, equilibrium output level, all firms' profits and social welfare are identical irrespective of whether the public firm maximizes welfare or profit and moves simultaneously with private...

White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) prove that in the mixed oligopoly the optimal subsidy, equilibrium output level, all firms' profits and social welfare are identical irrespective of whether the public firm maximizes welfare or profit and moves simultaneously with private...

This work analyzes the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technologies when cross-participation exists at ownership level. We show that cross-participation reduces the incentives to adopt the cost-saving production technology.