This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with that obtained in the...

This paper shows that when firms compete on prices in a mixed duopoly, the public firm chooses over-capacity when products are substitutes and under-capacity when products are complements. The private firm always chooses under-capacity. This result is in contrast with that obtained in the...

By considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned...

This work analyzes the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technologies when cross-participation exists at ownership level. We show that cross-participation reduces the incentives to adopt the cost-saving production technology.

This work analyzes the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technologies when cross-participation exists at ownership level. We show that cross-participation reduces the incentives to adopt the cost-saving production technology.