Investigating the market structure of Korea's credit rating industry during the 1990-2007 period, this paper utilizes the Rosse-Panzar methodology to evaluate the Korean government's financial restructuring policy for fostering the competitive condition in the credit rating industry after the...

Though government intervention is prevalent in the market for research and development (R&D), most literature has focused on the use of subsidies, patents or joint research ventures to obtain the efficient R&D investment. By using a two-stage duopoly model in which firms first choose the level...

A contract-based model of the endogenous determination of an organization's architecture is considered where a principal has the choice between a two- and a three-level organization. Each organizational architecture is plagued with its own specific form(s) of opportunism. We derive the...

Using data from Nippon Professional Baseball, which is the Japanese professional baseball league, we examine the relationship between within-team salary disparity and team performance. We find that greater salary disparity tends to result in better team performance, which is the opposite of what...

Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure. Numerous empirical contributions...

Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find...

Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find...

Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.

Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure. Numerous empirical contributions...

Markups, returns to scale and productivity can be uncovered from regressing output on inputs. However, econometric identification of theses parameters may be problematic due the simultaneity problem. A common solution is the IV method. However, usual instruments are only weakly correlated to the...