A contract-based model of the endogenous determination of an organization's architecture is considered where a principal has the choice between a two- and a three-level organization. Each organizational architecture is plagued with its own specific form(s) of opportunism. We derive the...

Using data from Nippon Professional Baseball, which is the Japanese professional baseball league, we examine the relationship between within-team salary disparity and team performance. We find that greater salary disparity tends to result in better team performance, which is the opposite of what...

Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure. Numerous empirical contributions...

Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find...

Standard economic theory assumes individuals choose actions that optimize their expected utility. In this paper we investigate how the existence of players with non-standard preferences may influence economic agents' behavior in some of the most frequently studied non-cooperative games. We find...

Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.

Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure. Numerous empirical contributions...

This paper discusses the results of the application of Jones' Inequality to the n-country, m-good Ricardo–Graham model. In the Jones' Inequality model, the number of countries is the same as the number of goods produced. On one hand, if a country is divided into regions for the purposes of...

The production assignment problem assumes a central role in the multi-country, multi-good Ricardian trade model. However, resolution of the problem is not sufficient to illustrate the shape of the world production frontier, even if the examination is limited to efficient production of all goods....

I introduce an alternative parameter-based definition of component- and headquarter-intensive sectors into the seminal model of global sourcing by Antràs and Helpman (2004, JPE). This approach overcomes problems of the original sector definition like counter intuitive classifications or...