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We study the general problem of public choice. We consider environments where agents’ identities may not be observable. A “rule” associates a preference profile with an alternative. An agent may create fictitious identities and submit multiple preference relations under them. We study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041704
We show that every strategy-proof random social choice function is a convex combination of strategy-proof deterministic social choice functions in a two-alternative voting model. This completely characterizes all strategy-proof random social choice functions in this setting.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576460
The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208444
We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and no-positive-transfers. This holds even for two bidders, two items, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572199
Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678824
This note presents results from modified dictator games in which the payoff-relevant game is either chosen randomly or by the recipients. We do not observe reciprocal behavior when recipients choose the game: Dictators do not condition their donations on the game chosen by recipients.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709095
We prove the following result which is equivalent to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem: when there are at least 3 alternatives, for any unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, at any given profile if an individual’s top ranked alternative differs from the social choice, then she...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594069
This paper is concerned with the problem of extending an antisymmetric binary relation on a set to a linear order on the power set. A necessary and sufficient condition is offered.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572204
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041815
We provide a short proof for the following characterization of the core in housing markets first proved by Ma (1994): the core is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and individual rationality.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189557