In an economy with voluntarily provided public goods and private product varieties, and a general class of CES preferences, it is shown that aggregate public good contribution follows an inverted-U pattern with respect to group size when private and public goods are substitutable in preferences....

Anton and Yao (1989) show that in split-award procurement auctions bidders coordinate their bids to sustain high buyer price. We relax their assumption that the buyer has full information about the suppliers’ production costs and restore the coordination outcome.

We examine Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, demonstrating that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium constitutes an interval. We then examine the properties of this set as (a) the number of firms becomes large and (b) the capacity cost increases.

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price...