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Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 2, pp. 682-694

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909315

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Heller, Yuval; Solan, Eilon; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 222-234

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511279

Communication and reputation in procurement auctions : some empirical evidence

Heinrich, Timo - In: Economics letters 114 (2012) 2, pp. 164-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009547328

Secure message transmission on directed networks

Renault, Jérôme; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 85 (2014), pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489258

Raising the price of talk : an experimental analysis of transparent leadership

Houser, Daniel; Levy, David M.; Padgitt, Kail; Peart, Sandra - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 105 (2014), pp. 208-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010465022

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan - In: Games and economic behavior 49 (2004) 2, pp. 313-344

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002396383

The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners : a study based on field and laboratory data

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo - In: Games and economic behavior 112 (2018), pp. 49-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174443

Mechanism design and communication networks

Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 489-533

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We … characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive … implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689312

Broken promises and hidden partnerships : an experiment

Chen, Jingnan; Houser, Daniel - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 157 (2019), pp. 754-774

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138539

Demanding or deferring? : an experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude

Wang, Siyu; Houser, Daniel - In: Games and economic behavior 115 (2019), pp. 381-395

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012175520