We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic...

When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the votersʼ most preferred alternatives. This important fact is known as the median voter result. Variants of it...

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering...

An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all...

We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete...

Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the...

We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different...

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a...

We study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate. A household shares risky prospects using a social welfare functional. We characterize the social welfare functionals such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member, and satisfies the Pareto principle...

We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a...