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Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Kóczy, László Á. - 2014
Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494607
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Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Kóczy, László Á. - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2014
Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094656
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How Brexit affects European Union power distribution
Kóczy, László Á. - 2016
The possible exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will have profound economic and political effects. Here we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Since the Lisbon treaty the exit does not require new negotiations as the success...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944871
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An axiomatization of the proportional rule in financial networks
Csóka, Péter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques - 2016
bankruptcy problems are characterized by network aspects and default may occur as a result of contagion. Indeed, in financial … on other agents can be collected. These network aspects make an axiomatic analysis challenging. This paper is the first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944898
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Universal characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced games
Solymosi, Tamás; Sziklai, Balázs - 2015
We provide a new modus operandi for the computation of the nucleolus in cooperative games with transferable utility. Using the concept of dual game we extend the theory of characterization sets. Dually essential and dually saturated coalitions determine both the core and the nucleolus in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444391
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The stable fixtures problem with payments
Biró, Péter; Kern, Walter; Paulusma, Daniël; … - 2015
We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444411
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Fair risk allocation in illiquid markets
Csóka, Péter - 2015
Let us consider a financially constrained leveraged financial firm having some divisions which have invested into some risky assets. Using coherent measures of risk the sum of the capital requirements of the divisions is larger than the capital requirement of the firm itself, there is some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444422
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Lying generators: Manipulability of centralized payoff mechanisms in electrical energy trade
Csercsik, Dávid - 2015
Optimal power flow (OPF) problems are focussing on the question how a power transmission network can be operated in the … model for the description of the transmission network, and assume linearly decreasing marginal cost of generators with … by a central authority who is aware of the network parameters and production characteristics. Furthermore, we assume that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444424
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Liability games
Csóka, Péter; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques - 2017
A firm has liabilities towards a group of creditors. We analyze the question of how to distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theory literature, we introduce the firm as an explicit player and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290246
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On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
Atay, Ata; Solymosi, Tamás - 2018
We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290252