Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Kóczy, László Á. |
Publisher: |
Budapest : Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies |
Subject: | quarrelling | rejected coalitions | a priori voting power | power indices | minimal winning coalitions | rational players |
Series: | IEHAS Discussion Papers ; MT-DP - 2014/31 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISBN: | 978-615-5447-50-1 |
Other identifiers: | 804406804 [GVK] hdl:10419/108362 [Handle] RePEc:has:discpr:1431 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: |
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Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Kóczy, László Á., (2014)
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Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Kóczy, László Á., (2014)
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