Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

The group identification literature mostly revolves around the problem of identifying individuals in the community who belong to groups with ethnic or religious identity. Here we use the same model framework to identify individuals who play key role in some sense. In particular we will focus on...

This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules are characterized by...

The chosen tournament format has a fundamental impact on the popularity and success of a sport. Efficiency of a format describes how well it can reproduce the real but hidden power ranking of the participants. We compare the efficiency of the formats of two individual sports that share similar...

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our...

This paper provides a search theoretic model with endogenous job creation, and homogenous workers and firms. The model introduces bidding costs and allows the current employer to make a counteroffer with probability q when the worker receives an outside offer. In equilibrium, a higher level of...

Suppose that the agents of a matching market contact each other randomly and form new pairs if is in their interest. Does such a process always converge to a stable matching if one exists? If so, how quickly? Are some stable matchings more likely to be obtained by this process than others? In...

A matching game is a cooperative game (N; v) defined on a graph G = (N;E) with an edge weighting w : E ! R+. The player set is N and the value of a coalition S N is defined as the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph induced by S. First we present an O(nm+n2 log n) algorithm that tests...

The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G(E,V) with an edge weighting w:E_ùR+ and the problem is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector p.RV that satisfies pu+pv=w(uv) for all uv.M and pu=0 for all u unmatched in M. A solution is stable if it...