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Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities
Martimort, David; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried - In: The Rand journal of economics 37 (2006) 4, pp. 763-782
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003545005
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Moral hazard, hold-up, and the optimal allocation of control rights
Yerramilli, Vijay - In: The Rand journal of economics 42 (2011) 4, pp. 705-728
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009427315
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The form of incentive contracts : agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability
Poblete, Joaquín; Spulber, Daniel F. - In: The Rand journal of economics 43 (2012) 2, pp. 215-234
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009618783
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Hidden insurance in a moral-hazard economy
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - In: The Rand journal of economics 46 (2015) 4, pp. 777-790
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481441
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Incentives, wages, employment, and the division of labor in teams
Rauh, Michael T. - In: The Rand journal of economics 45 (2014) 3, pp. 533-552
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423881
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Implementing high-powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply
Chu, Leon Yang; Sappington, David Edward Michael - In: The Rand journal of economics 40 (2009) 2, pp. 296-316
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003843118
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Delegation and incentives
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - In: The Rand journal of economics 39 (2008) 3, pp. 664-682
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761351
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Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions
Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: The Rand journal of economics 36 (2005) 2, pp. 318-336
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003238877
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Moral hazard severity and contract design
Dye, Ronald A.; Sridhar, Sri S. - In: The Rand journal of economics 36 (2005) 1, pp. 78-92
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003002565
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Structural estimation of a principal-agent model : moral hazard in medical insurance
Vera-Hernández, Marcos - In: The Rand journal of economics 34 (2003) 4, pp. 670-693
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001918870