Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 871
Cover Image
Incentives vs. selection in promotion tournaments: Can a designer kill two birds with one stone?
Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Stracke, Rudi; … - 2011
: incentive provision and selection. Our theoretical analysis reveals a trade-off for the tournament designer between the two …, letting more heterogeneous participants compete early increases the accuracy in selection. Experimental evidence supports our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278311
Cover Image
Dynamic Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Multi-Stage Promotion Contests
Stracke, Rudi; Sunde, Uwe - 2014
compensated by positive continuation-value and selection effects. Due to these positive dynamic incentive effects of heterogeneity …This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests … with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398273
Cover Image
Dynamic Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Multi-Stage Promotion Contests
Stracke, Rudi; Sunde, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
compensated by positive continuation-value and selection effects. Due to these positive dynamic incentive effects of heterogeneity …This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests … with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886143
Cover Image
Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004
the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are so far thin on the ground. In addition, these effects may be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940
Cover Image
Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: evidence from a firm level experiment
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - 2006
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267490
Cover Image
Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006
is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611
Cover Image
Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822207
Cover Image
Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763542
Cover Image
Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are so far thin on the ground. In addition, these effects may be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763609
Cover Image
Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These ‘conformists' have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761807