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Team governance: empowerment or hierarchical control

Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268432

What explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A panel data analysis for 1977 - 2009

Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - 2012

work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282632

Risk-taking tournaments: theory and experimental evidence

Nieken, Petra; Sliwka, Dirk - 2008

We study risk-taking behavior in a simple two person tournament in a theoretical model as well as a laboratory experiment. First, a model is analyzed in which two agents simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy and we allow for all possible degrees of correlation between the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268692

How unjust! An experimental investigation of supervisors' evaluation errors and agents' incentives

Marchegiani, Lucia; Reggiani, Tommaso; Rizzolli, Matteo - 2011

In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent's effort; ii) aims at inducing the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, deserving...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282338

Deferred Compensation and Gift Exchange : An Experimental Investigation into Multi-Period Labor Markets

Wallace, Brian; Seltzer, Andrew J.; Huck, Steffen - 2004

This paper examines the relationship between firms? wage offers and workers? supply of effort using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and wages are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261943

The sociology of groups and the economics of incentives: theory and evidence on compensation systems

Encinosa, William E.; Gaynor, Martin; Rebitzer, James B. - 2005

data. Factors emphasized in the economic theory of agency, notably risk aversion, also shape pay policies but these factors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267317

High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect

Glazer, Amihai; Gersbach, Hans - 2004

We consider a firm which pays a worker for his effort over several periods. The more the firm pays in one period, the wealthier the worker is in the following periods, and so the more he must be paid for a given effort. This wealth effect can induce an employer to pay little initially and more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261892

Incentives and the sorting of altruistic agents into street-level bureaucracies

Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert - 2008

Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269193

Extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motives: Standard and behavioral approaches to agency and labor markets

Rebitzer, James B.; Taylor, Lowell J. - 2010

Employers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272684

Potential, prizes and performance : testing tournament theory with professional tennis data

Sunde, Uwe - 2003

This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the … contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been … underlies any agency theory about elimination tournaments, and has been empirically tested in other contexts. The evidence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261647