Showing 1 - 10 of 22
In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042941
We study the evolution of R&D networks in a Cournot model where firms may lower marginal costs due to bilateral R&D collaborations. Stochastically stable R&D networks exhibit the dominant group architecture, and, contrary to the existing literature, generically unique predictions about the size...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261606
The paper models auctions with bidders who have reference dependent preferences and who may be loss averse. The endogenous reference point is defined as either the ex-ante or the interim expected price of the good, depending on whether bidders are naive or sophisticated. Equilibria with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263918
We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that in multidimensional single peaked type spaces, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it satisfies a familiar and simple condition called 2-cycle...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930783
I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930796
This paper examines how variation in mood influences subjective risk and hence auction prices for art in London during the period 1990–2007. The private value of an object is closely related to taste and mood which is proxied for by the variation in weather. Using a unique data set that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576962
Many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when the winner of the auction resells the item won to one of the participants from the original auction. The existence of such transactions may initially appear counter intuitive. However, this paper will show that active inter-bidder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594585
We use a unique dataset to examine the revenue differences between auctions with a hard-close ending rule versus those with a soft-close ending rule. We find that selling items using the soft-close rule increases the selling price by an amount between $25 and $44 (or 13–20 percent) over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597461
In auctions with private information acquisition costs, we completely characterize (socially) efficient and (revenue) optimal two-stage mechanisms, with the first stage being an entry right allocation mechanism and the second stage being a traditional private good provision mechanism. Both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616898
We study a symmetric independent private values auction model where the revenue-maximizing seller faces a cost cn of attracting n bidders to the auction. If the distribution of valuations possesses an increasing failure rate (IFR), the seller overinvests in attracting bidders compared to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572373