This paper studies communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk, and show that when these...

We introduce the concept of disjoint payoff matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payoff secure. By putting minor structure on the discontinuities, we need only check payoffs at each strategy rather than in neighborhoods of each strategy profile,...

This paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities. Exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods, we prove existence of non-trivial fulfilled-expectations equilibrium. We formalize the concept of industry viability,...

In most electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers to a uniform price auction. These markets are often modelled as simpler pure-strategy Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) with continuous supply functions. Critics argue that the discreteness and discontinuity of the required...

This paper reconsiders the well-known comparison of equilibrium entry levels into a Cournot industry under free entry, second best (control of entry but not production) and first best (control of entry and production). Allowing for the possibility of limited increasing returns to scale in...

This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms. The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features...

I study price competition in settings where end products are combinations of components supplied by different monopolists, nesting standard models of perfect complements and imperfect substitutes. I show sufficient conditions for a discrete-choice demand system to yield demand for each product...

This paper discusses the incentive to bundle when consumer valuations are non-additive and/or when products are supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, a firm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount when demand for the bundle is more elastic than the overall demand...

We study a dynamic model with an incumbent monopolist and entry in every subsequent period. We first show that if all consumers have the same switching cost, then the intertemporal profits of the incumbent are the same as if there was only one period. We then study the consequences of...

This paper analyzes the stability of the (Pareto efficient) nonsunspot equilibria as a function of the constraints faced by consumers in their ability to transfer wealth between states of nature. Equilibria that are stable for the certainty economy define nonsunspot equilibria that are stable in...