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Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
Doepke, Matthias; Townsend, Robert M. - In: Journal of economic theory 126 (2006) 1, pp. 235-285
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003278363
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Multitask principal-agent problems : optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
Bond, Philip; Gomes, Armando R. - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 1, pp. 175-211
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003812285
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Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
Krasa, Stefan; Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of economic theory 134 (2007) 1, pp. 379-404
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003480273
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On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic theory 130 (2006) 1, pp. 168-204
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379245
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Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - In: Journal of economic theory 136 (2007) 1, pp. 236-259
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003552133
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Ironing without control
Toikka, Juuso - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 6, pp. 2510-2526
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412858
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Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
Grochulski, Borys; Zhang, Yuzhe - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 6, pp. 2356-2388
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412869
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Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
Evans, Robert; Reiche, Soenje - In: Journal of economic theory 157 (2015), pp. 1159-1187
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525452
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Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
Antinolfi, Gaetano; Carli, Francesco - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 105-119
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549038
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Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design
Bergemann, Dirk; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 679-701
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549219