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Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
Li, Yunan - In: Journal of economic theory 186 (2020), pp. 1-54
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415912
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Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
Li, Yunan - In: Journal of economic theory 182 (2019), pp. 279-328
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012133305
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Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 1, pp. 74-110
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009243017
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Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 1, pp. 72-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001227558
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When to fire a CEO : optimal termination in dynamic contracts
Spear, Stephen E.; Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 120 (2005) 2, pp. 239-256
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002636430
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Optimal CEO turnover
Wang, Cheng; Yang, Youzhi - In: Journal of economic theory 203 (2022), pp. 1-38
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013374950
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Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 1, pp. 74-111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008812506
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Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 1, pp. 72-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007700405
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When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
Spear, Stephen E.; Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 120 (2005) 2, pp. 239-256
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007636345