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Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 1, pp. 72-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001227558
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Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 1, pp. 74-110
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009243017
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When to fire a CEO : optimal termination in dynamic contracts
Spear, Stephen E.; Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 120 (2005) 2, pp. 239-256
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002636430
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Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 1, pp. 72-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007700405
Cover Image
When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
Spear, Stephen E.; Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 120 (2005) 2, pp. 239-256
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007636345
Cover Image
Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
Wang, Cheng - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 1, pp. 74-111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008812506