Showing 1 - 10 of 20
is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107345
We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183541
neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions are enough to block an allocation which is not in the core, due to … the core provided by Vind and Schmeidler (1972) to economies with asymmetrically informed traders. We then focus on … information sharing rules based on the coalitions' size. Assuming the existence of coalitions to which the sharing rule associates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004814
social conventions by embedding a static bargaining setting in a dynamic process; Over time agents revise their coalitions … a logit specification of choice probabilities, we find that the stability of a core allocation decreases in the wealth … of the richest player, and that stochastically stable allocations are core allocations which minimize the wealth of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111822
This article analyzes a much debated clause in the 1996 coalition contract between SPD and F.D.P. in Rheinland-Pfalz. Two parties write a contract, based on which decisions under incomplete information have to be made at a later point in time. It is shown that a complex complete contract can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005620143
For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks … required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most n-1, where n is the number of … players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108416
information. One of them is the core and the other is known as coalitional fairness. The set of agents is modelled by a mixed … same agent can have common, private or pooled information when she becomes member of different coalitions. It is shown that … of small agents. We also focus on the information mechanism based on size of coalitions introduced in [18] and obtain a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109801
Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259698
assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when … outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005620003
This note provides simple proofs of the equivalence among the core, equilibrium and limited arbitrage in markets with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005620060