: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …

outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply …

This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers …-cooperative games, and they prove to be both descriptive and predictive in the assignment games analyzed here. The "logit core" allows …

members of deviating coalitions move �first in choosing a coordinated strategy. We accordingly defi�ne what we call the phi-core …, and characterize the phi-core allocations of a cartel formation game and of a public goods economy. …

For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks … required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most n-1, where n is the number of … players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far …

information. One of them is the core and the other is known as coalitional fairness. The set of agents is modelled by a mixed … that the core is contained in the set of coalitionally fair allocations under some assumptions. This result provides …

Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set …

This note provides simple proofs of the equivalence among the core, equilibrium and limited arbitrage in markets with …