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This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824357
This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers …-cooperative games, and they prove to be both descriptive and predictive in the assignment games analyzed here. The "logit core" allows …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251543
outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005620003
members of deviating coalitions move �first in choosing a coordinated strategy. We accordingly defi�ne what we call the phi-core …, and characterize the phi-core allocations of a cartel formation game and of a public goods economy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565960
: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009328147
Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259698
question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely: is there a subset of bidders that prefers forming a small bidding … the grand coalition is not necessarily core stable, as opposed to the zero externality case, where the stability of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211237
For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks … required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is less than or equal to n(n-1)/2, where n …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694029
direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is … number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by … deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837444
core" and show that the subgame-perfect equilibrium allocations of the intermediation game are contained in the … intermediation core, similar to the inclusion of competitive equilibrium allocations in the core usually studied. We also identify …, in terms of the supporting intermediary structures, intermediation core allocations which are also subgame …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008470472