constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …

This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks …

we exploit the large rise in relative performance awards and the share of equity pay in the UK over the last two decades … governance appears weak. Second, there is substantial “pay-for-luck” as remuneration increases with random positive shocks, even …