Similar Search Results

Multilateral bargaining in networks: On the prevalence of inefficiencies

Lee, Joosung - 2015

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307292

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324912

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - 2004

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324956

Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - 2004

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where `citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324966

Special Interests and Technological Change

Bellettini, Giorgio; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. - 2003

We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325072

Agenda control in coalition formation

Bloch, Francis; Rottier, Stéphane - 2000

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyse the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognised to form coalitions in simple games. We characterise those sets of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608580

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Weikard, Hans-Peter - 2005

players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called optimal sharing which … cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called non-essentiality and determine the set of stable … cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312346

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters Turnout?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312400

Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha; Oak, Mandar - 2006

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312508

Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - 2006

Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312542

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last