A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

This paper considers a government that seeks both to redistribute income and to encourage or discourage the consumption of a certain good. This good is assumed to be either a merit or demerit good. Individuals differ in their exogenous income and in their preferences for the merit good. The...

This paper develops a dynamic model wherein production generates pollution that is viewed as a public bad by consumers. There are two types of consumers : those who are altuist a la Barro-Becker and leave bequests to their children and those who are pure life-cyclers. Both types of consumers...

In this paper, we study the welfare effects of monetary policy in a simple overlapping generation economy in which agents voluntary contribute to a public good. Inflation has two effects at equilibrium: it increases voluntary contributions and it misallocates private consumption across time. We...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. We show that if an agent is sufficiently risk averse, voluntary contribution is a decreasing function of average efficiency of depollution technology. If on the contrary, the...

In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.

This paper dels with optimal taxation in a two-class economy with two private commodities and labour. We derive optimal non-linear income and linear commodity taxes in the presence of merit goods. We formulate merit goods arguments via pathology of individual choice. We assume weak separability...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...

This paper examines the properties of the optimal nonlinear income tax when preferences are quasilinear in leisure and heterogeneous. Individuals differ in their ability and in their preferences for leisure. The government seeks to redistribute income. It can perfectly observe the level of...