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Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations

Athey, Susan; Miller, David A. - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3, pp. 299-354

We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599391

Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations

Athey, Susan; Miller, David A. - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812743

Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189075

Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry

Ye, Lixin; Zhang, Chenglin - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 1, pp. 141-173

We consider consumer entry in the canonical monopolistic nonlinear pricing model ( Mussa and Rosen 1978) wherein consumers learn their preference 'types' after incurring privately known entry costs. We show that by taking into account consumer entry, the nature of optimal nonlinear pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010066

Optimal sequential contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 207-244

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536866

Strategic investment evaluation

Kirpalani, Rishabh; Madsen, Erik - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1141-1180

We study the interaction of incentives to free-ride on information acquisition and strategically delay irreversible investment in environments in which multiple firms evaluate an investment opportunity. In our model, two firms decide how quickly to privately obtain information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536873

Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Kolb, Aaron - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 539-559

chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public …, and she builds a reputation by continuing when the stakes reach a new minimum. We discuss applications to corporate … reputation management, online vendor reputation, and limit pricing with stochastic demand. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536892

Bargaining with evolving private information

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 885-916

I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation, and the seller privately observes her stochastically changing cost of delivering the good. Prices fall gradually at the early...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536929

How to sell in a sequential auction market

Hendricks, Kenneth; Wiseman, Thomas - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1451-1471

We characterize an optimal mechanism for a seller with one unit of a good facing N ≥ 3 buyers and a single competitor who sells another identical unit in a second-price auction. Buyers who do not get the seller's good compete in the competitor's subsequent auction. The mechanism features...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536969

Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals

Blume, Andreas; Park, In-Uck - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1183-1223

We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated -- the quid pro quo motive -- or from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536985