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Optimal Incentives without Expected Utility
González-Jiménez, Víctor - 2022
contracts that are typically observed in practice such as salaries, lump-sum bonuses, and high-performance commissions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321765
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Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Bovenberg, A.L.; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001
and the firm can base its incentive payments on good information. Competition, however, may allow themarket and explicit … contracts to crowd out implicit insurance, even though the latter yields higher welfare.Integrating the principal-agent and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325071
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The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities
Frijters, Paul; Tieman, Alexander F. - 1999
In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means ofdirect coordination or the enforcement of re-commitment devices suchas contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In alocal interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324664
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The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Davis, John B. - 2003
incomplete information into games of complete information. Itargues that while the conception of the individual in games of … complete information offerspotential advances over the problematic neoclassical conception of the individual, Harsanyi …'smore realistic incomplete information games framework essentially re-introduces the difficultiesfrom the neoclassical conception. A …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324903
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Measuring Power And Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties
van den Brink, René; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Steffen, Frank - 2009
A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have a considerable impact on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325902
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Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2010
Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326070
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An Optimal Signaling Equilibrium
Karamychev, Vladimir; Visser, Bauke - 2011
This paper analyses the optimal combination of costly and costless messages that a Sender uses in a signaling game if he is able to choose among all equilibrium communication strategies. We provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium that maximizes the Sender's ex ante expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326161
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An Optimal Signaling Equilibrium
Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Visser, Bauke - 2011
This paper analyses the optimal combination of costly and costless messages that a Sender uses in a signaling game if he is able to choose among all equilibrium communication strategies. We provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium that maximizes the Sender's ex ante expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176597
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Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders : Dictator and Opinion Leaders
van den Brink, René; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Steffen, Frank - 2010
A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have a considerable impact on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207218
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Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets
Riedl, Arno; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2003
Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by paying high wages, and workers reciprocate by providing high efforts. Tax LSE is theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324733