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Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964459

Delegation or Voting

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

quality has been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that of two voting procedures …. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition. The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137291

Delegation or Voting

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

qualityhas been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that oftwo voting procedures …. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition.The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257239

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257421

Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research

Kurz, Sascha; Maaser, Nicola; Napel, Stefan; Weber, Matthias - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

Power index research has been a very active field in the last decades. Will this continue or are all the important questions solved? We argue that there are still many opportunities to conduct useful research with and on power indices. Positive and normative questions keep calling for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272591

Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255492

Do Polls create Momentum in Political Competition?

Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255586

Household Inequality, Welfare, and the Setting of Trade Policy

Francois, Joseph; Rojas-Romagosa, Hugo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

We analyze general equilibrium relationships between trade policy and the household distribution of income, decomposing social welfare into real income level and variance components through Gini and Atkinson indexes. We embed these inequality-adjusted social welfare functions in a general...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255634

A Simultaneous Analysis of Turnout and Voting under Proportional Representation: Theory and Experiments

Kamm, Aaron; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

particular they predict (i) a Polarization Effect: reduced strategic party choice when voting is voluntary makes voters more … likely to vote for extreme parties (conditional on voting at all); (ii) an Extremist Effect: voters supporting extreme … world elections. Hence, the interaction between turnout and strategic voting that has been neglected in most of the previous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255685

The Condorcet Paradox Revisited

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255823