Showing 1 - 10 of 16
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. We characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information. The type of one player is common knowledge. The type of the other player is drawn from a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306972
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306976
This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306984
Perfectly discriminating contests (or all pay auction) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals … devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307018
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307019
In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307034
. Für den Benchmarkfall, in dem der Wettbewerb zwischen den Unternehmen die Form eines Contests annimmt, überwiegt der …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307043
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307683
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333027
four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to … same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead to higher efforts for all players, but mainly … by lower-ability players. Division of prizes leads to the predicted effects. In parallel contests, too many players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574205