Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our...

Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our...

We propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from...

We propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from...