In the article, we use two major solutions in cooperative game theory ?the Shapley value and the nucleolus? to study electoral bargaining in the electoral environment characterizing the French Regional elections of March 2010. Classification JEL : D71, D72

Arrow's "impossibility" and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but "saturating" domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly) monotone "economic...

We investigate refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the first refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and GOTCHA sets of...

Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial...

This paper examines a model of multijurisdiction formation where individuals' characteristics are uniformly distributed over a finite interval. Every jurisdiction locates a public facility and distributes its cost equally among the residents. We consider the notions of Nash and local Nash...

In this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.

This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games without spillovers. We find that population monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player...

We analyze and evaluate the different decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to date. All the existing studies use the Banzhaf index (for binary voting) or the Shapley-Shubik index (for distributive politics). We argue that the nucleolus can be...