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We investigate refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the first refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and GOTCHA sets of...
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Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369321
In this article we use the theory of power indices to evaluate the respective influence of the two classes of electors in the polling method introduced by the electoral law of 29 June 1820, known as the law of ?double vote?. We show in a simplified framework that the voting power of the ?major?...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187891
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845478
In the article, we use two major solutions in cooperative game theory ?the Shapley value and the nucleolus? to study electoral bargaining in the electoral environment characterizing the French Regional elections of March 2010. Classification JEL : D71, D72
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