Two game theoretic solution theories, the M1 (i) bargaining set and the M1 (im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M1 (im) is significantly and...

This study evaluates the importance of accurately modeling strategic threats in complex multilateral conflict-of-interest decision problems. The objective is to improve prescriptive accuracy when cooperative n-person game theory is applied to the analysis of such problems. A competitive...

This article reports an experimental test of the M1 (im) Cooperative and M1 (im) Shapley bargaining set solutions in 3-person superadditive, sidepayment games with nonempty core. The results indicate that, on an overall basis, M1 (im) Cooperative has greater predictive accuracy than does M1 (im)...

This article defines two new solution concepts for non-sidepayment games - the λ-transfer nucleolus and the λ-transfer disruption value - and reports the results of an experiment testing their predictive accuracy against that of a third solution concept, the well-known λ-transfer value...

This article reports an experimental test that juxtaposes the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function v(S) against the homomollifier function h(S) proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). The test was conducted in the context of 5-person cooperative sidepayment non-constant-sum games with...

This article presents a procedure for indexing n-person cooperative games in terms of degree of nonsymmetry. This ordinal-level index is limited to sidepayment games, but applies generally to games of three or more players. To validate the index, a laboratory experiment was conducted with...

This paper reports a competitive test of minimum resource and pivotal power theories in tetradic situations. Using resource distributions for which the theories make distinct predictions, the study obtained data on the formation of coalitions and the division of payoffs. Results indicate that...