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This paper presents experimental results from an analysis of two similar games, the repeated ultimatum game and the repeated best-shot game. The experiment examines whether the amount and content of information given to players affects the evolution of play in the two games. In one experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598532
In signalling environments ranging from consumption to education, high-quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower-quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353789
We report the results of an experiment in which subjects play games repeatedly against changing opponents. In one treatment, "senders" send messages to "receivers" indicating intended actions in that round, and receivers observe senders' previous-round actions (when matched with another...
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We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of "correlated equilibrium", an important generalization of Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we examine the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private third-party...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008670414
Behavior in trust games has been linked to general notions of trust and trustworthiness, important components of social capital. In the equilibrium of a trust game, the investor does not invest, foreseeing that the allocator would keep all of the returns. We use a human-subjects experiment to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005066556
In sender--receiver games high--quality types can distinguish themselves from low--quality types by sending a costly signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We examine equilibria where medium types separate themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550943
This article reports findings of an experiment motivated by a dynamic labor market model that considers the problem faced by employers in making hiring decisions between workers of different types. The question examined here is how quickly employers learn about the ability of a group of workers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005562041