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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004882732
This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009463429
В данной работе рассмотрена проблема «принципал-агент», специфичная для исламской банковской системы. Для решения проблемы морального риска, возникающей в...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246467
preserve biodiversity. The design of these policy instruments brings together issues in auction design, contract theory …, biology, and monitoring technology. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard model, we show that optimal contract design …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005536557
Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256153
Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016271
may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional … equity contracts to intermediate debtors. This combination, however, is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract that is … to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092395
lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and … additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors, which is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract, only attractive for … seek to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861
We make a first step in the literature to analyse a hybrid model of credit rationing with simultaneous presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. Motivated by the observation that credit markets in less-developed countries are rather opaque owing to the lack of necessary institutions to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207752
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002578887