Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 106
Cover Image
Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers’ work. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005056862
Cover Image
Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers’ work. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703358
Cover Image
Feedback and incentives: experimental evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268675
Cover Image
Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791004
Cover Image
Feedback and incentives : experimental evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - In: Labour economics : official journal of the European … 16 (2009) 6, pp. 679-688
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929277
Cover Image
Feedback and incentives : experimental evidence
Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Poulsen, Anders (contributor);  … - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. -- Performance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003688788
Cover Image
Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004
Variable pay not only creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting the more productive employees (Lazear 1986, 2000). However, due to lack of natural data, empirical analyses of the relative importance of the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940
Cover Image
Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611
Cover Image
Performance pay and within-firm wage inequality
Barth, Erling; Bratsberg, Bernt; Hægeland, Torbjørn; … - 2009
This paper examines the impact of performance-related pay on wage differentials within firms. Our theoretical framework predicts that, compared to a fixed pay system, pay schemes based on individual output increase within-firm wage inequality, while group-based bonuses have minor effects on wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269356
Cover Image
Performance Pay and Within-Firm Wage Inequality
Barth, Erling; Bratsberg, Bernt; Hægeland, Torbjørn; … - 2008
This paper examines the impact of performance-related pay on wage differentials within firms. Our theoretical framework predicts that, compared to a fixed pay system, pay schemes based on individual effort increase within-firm wage inequality, while group-based bonuses have minor effects on wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011968305