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The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Bergemann, Dirk - 2019

We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex-post participation constraints. We establish necessary and suﬀicient conditions that determine exhaustively when the optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866350

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

generated across all models of buyers' information that are consistent with the common prior and across all Bayesian equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977350

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We study auction design when bidders have a pure common value equal to the maximum of their independent signals. In the revenue maximizing mechanism, each bidder makes a payment that is independent of his signal and the allocation discriminates in favor of bidders with lower signals. We provide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977351

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have … correlated equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054088

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination."We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055412

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

Consider the following "informational robustness" question: what can we say about the set of outcomes that may arise in equilibrium of a Bayesian game if players may observe some additional information? This set of outcomes will correspond to a solution concept that is weaker than equilibrium,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019432

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

. The characterization corresponds to the set of (a version of) incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub … Bayes correlated equilibria.We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under … which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This order captures the role of information in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024335