Showing 61 - 70 of 116
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762850
players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria … always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325804
This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800354
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination." We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686936
. The characterization corresponds to the set of (a version of) incomplete information correlated equilibria which we dub … Bayes correlated equilibria. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency …) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This order captures the role of information in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267
players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria … always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176751
This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186581
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may … correlated equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153613
Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game … equivalent to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given … equilibria. We discuss the relation of the solution concept to alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium in incomplete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153614
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire covert information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165690