Showing 1 - 10 of 28
This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' (forthcoming).<P> In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game....</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255446
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Annals of Operations Research' (forthcoming).<P> We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures, being structures where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255614
This discussion paper led to the article with the same title in 'Social Choice and Welfare' (2014), 43, 173-194.<P> We consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river. Each agent has quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, where the benefit of consuming an...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255637
paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems … dividends proportional to weights determined by a power measure for union stable systems. Moreover, the well-known Myerson value … is exactly the Harsanyi power solution for the equal power measure, and on a special subclass of union stable systems the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255839
A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255881
A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256159
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256194
feasible coalitions which models the partial cooperation will be given by a union stable system. These systems contain, as … applied point of view. Moreover, union stable systems are a natural framework for many other economic situations that arise in … stable system. For that, we first analyze the relation between the restricted game and the conference game to establish later …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293667
A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391880
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090573