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An Efficient and Fair Solution for Communication Graph Games
Brink, Rene van den; Khmelnitskaya, Anna; Laan, Gerard … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Economics Letters', 2012, 117, 786-789.<P> We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256656
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Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems
Algaba, Encarnación; Brink, Rene van den; Dietz, Chris - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
literature, such as communication networks and hierarchies. We introduce and analyze accessible union stable systems where union … attention to th e class of cycle-free accessible union stable systems. We also consider cooperative games with restricted … cooperation where the set of feasible coalitions is an accessible union stable system, and provide an axiomatization of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256706
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Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation
Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'European Journal of Operational Research', 2013, 224, 167-179.<P> In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256829
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The Myerson Value and Superfluous Supports in Union Stable Systems
Algaba, Encarnacion; Bilbao, Jesus Mario; Brink, Rene … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
set of feasible coalitions which models the partial cooperation will be given by a union stable system. These systems … theoretical and applied point of view. Moreover, union stable systems are a natural framework for many other economic situations … the supports of the union stable system. For that, we first analyze the relation between the restricted game and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256986
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
Brink, Rene van den; Funaki, Yukihiko - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257081
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Games on Union Closed Systems
Brink, Rene van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature various models of games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257183
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Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation
Brink, Rene van den; Dietz, Chris - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2014, 76, 343-361.<P> It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of (weighted) digraph games. To be specific, they are...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257309
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A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 148, 2737-2748.<P> In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257390
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Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts
Brink, Rene van den; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 153, 33-45.<P> Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257404
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) propose the downstream incremental solution as the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable … externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of satiation points, it appears that every weighted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257471