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Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
Alemante, Fasil; Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 62 (2016) 4, pp. 765-783
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646478
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Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 1, pp. 10-12
neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set. …Anonymity and neutrality conflict if the number of individuals is even and a single alternative is selected. Limited …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603133
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The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice : correspondences
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics letters 132 (2015), pp. 109-111
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431425
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Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics letters 128 (2015), pp. 79-82
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383021
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Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - Department of Economics, College of William & Mary - 2006
disallows both anonymity and neutrality. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252281
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Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - Department of Economics, College of William & Mary - 2006
extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588182
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Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Economics Letters 128 (2015) C, pp. 79-82
satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208444