In Kalai-Smorodinsky's solution utility gains are seen as relevant with regard to the disagreement point. This paper focuses on the utility losses with respect to the maximum achievable level and introduces a "complementary" solution to Kalai-Smorodinsky's. An axiomatic characterization of the...

It is well known that, in distributions problems, "Fairness" rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see Young (1994) and Moulin (1988) among many others). This paper provides, in this context, interesting basis in defense of intermediate agreements when two prominent proposals, representing...

Some monotonicity conditions for bargaining problems with claims are presented. They are used in providing a characterization of the extended claim-egalitarian solution.

Two solution concepts have been proposed for bargaining problems with claims, namely, the proportional solution, introduced by Chun & Thomson (1992), and the extended claim-egalitarian solution, [see Bossert (1993) and Marco (1993)]. Neither of these solutions exhaust all possible gains from...

A new solution concept to monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility is introduced. This proposal, called the coalitional equal-loss solution, is based on the idea that players withing a coalition should have equal losses from a point of maximum expectations. The proposal...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution concept for bargaining problems, which modifies Chun's Equal-Loss Solution in a way that ensures the individual rationality. We also consider its lexicographic extension which turns out to be both individually rational and Pareto Optimal....

Some shortcomings of the equal-loss solution for bargaining problems are noticed: in general, it is not individually rational, and in case it is, then turns out a selection of the YU solutions. Finally, a new way of proving characterization results is provided.

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity on the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-Additivity. We find that µ-Additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, Anonymity and Continuity,...

We analyze the behavior of the extended claim-egalitarian solution for bargaining problems with claims, in situations involving variations in the number of agents. An axiomatic characterization of this solution is presented.