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How elections are impacted by production, economic growth and conflict

Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli - In: International game theory review 18 (2016) 1, pp. 1-29

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524475

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment

Hausken, Kjell - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674264

Production and Conflict in Risky Elections

Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli - Handelshøgskolen, Universitetet i Stavanger - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818591

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Hausken, Kjell - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647311

On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts

Hausken, Kjell - In: Economics Letters 116 (2012) 3, pp. 504-507

production and conflict model. Six economics examples illustrate the unrealistic implications of rent seeking analysis. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594205

The impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government

Hausken, Kjell; Zhuang, Jun - In: European Journal of Operational Research 225 (2013) 2, pp. 363-376

A company allocates a resource between safety effort and production. The government earns taxes on production. The disaster probability is modeled as a contest between the disaster magnitude and the two players’ safety efforts. The model illustrates that safety efforts are strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594988

The paradox and non-paradox of power for groups

Hausken, Kjell - In: International Journal of Public Policy 8 (2012) 4/5/6, pp. 308-336

for their aggregate production which is fixed for the n groups. A paradox of power, with all strong agents in a small … common non-paradox of power, with all weak agents in a small group and all strong agents in the large group, arises for a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010670249

Stubbornness, Power, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Multiple Equilibria

Hausken, Kjell - In: Theory and Decision 62 (2007) 2, pp. 135-160

Axelord’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 ×Â 2 games with two pure … strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase in conflict. This … means that conflict will be less frequent. This approach leads to a new power index and a new measure of stubbornness, both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709915

Incumbent policy, benefits provision, and the triggering and spread of revolutionary uprisings

Hausken, Kjell; Ncube, Mthuli - In: The Economics of peace and security journal : Eps journal 12 (2017) 1, pp. 54-63

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011636846

Gordon Tullock : a Nobel Prize left unbestowed

Hausken, Kjell - In: Journal of bioeconomics 18 (2016) 2, pp. 121-127

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011661171