In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are generally...

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical dataon induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in acontrolled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory:effort and sabotage...

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are generally...

We experimentally investigate how different information about others’ individual contributions affects conditional cooperators’ willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are...

How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest...

In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. In a two-player game reciprocation is economically...

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

We investigate an experimental representatives’ trust game which resembles trust relation-ships between representatives of organisations. Personality traits of subjects are elicited by a personality questionnaire (Cattell’s 16 PF-R) which is well established in personnel psychology. For the...