We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state of nature, the agent has to incur a cost, (g) , to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, depending on the value of (g), incite the agent to gather or not to gather...

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost 'g' to learn it.Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependingon the value of 'g', try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather...

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will...